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COMMENT
Admissions Online: Statements of a Party Opponent in the
Internet Age
I. Introduction
Returning home from a party, Susan drove her car through a red light
and collided with John’s pickup. John suffered severe injuries. After the
accident, Susan went home and posted a status update on her Facebook
page. In the post she briefly described what happened in the wreck,
including the statement: “I knew I shouldn’t have driven, I had too much
wine!” In the comments section following Susan’s post, her friend Jane
responded, “Wow! You better get a good lawyer!” After reading Jane’s
post, Susan clicked a thumbs-up icon, indicating she “liked” Jane’s
comment. Several of Susan’s friends, including Steve, a mutual friend of
accident victim John, read the posts.
John subsequently brought a civil suit against Susan, and designated
Steve as a trial witness who would testify regarding the posts on Susan’s
Facebook page. Specifically, John wants Steve to testify that Susan
admitted she had too much to drink prior to the accident, his goal being to
prove that Susan in fact was intoxicated at the time of the wreck. John also
wants Steve to testify about Susan’s “liking” of Jane’s comment to show
that defendant Susan thought she needed a lawyer due to her actions.
Susan objects to the admission of Steve’s testimony, invoking the
hearsay rule.1 According to Susan, John cannot use her out-of-court
statement for its truth in litigation. John argues that Susan’s post about
drinking is an admissible non-hearsay statement of an opposing party
because it was Susan’s own statement.2 He also argues that Susan’s “liking”
of Jane’s comment shows Susan approved the comment and thus Jane’s
words are admissible as the adopted statement of Susan.3
This hypothetical situation demonstrates the impact of the Internet on the
admissibility of evidence, particularly in the context of hearsay. The
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) generally exclude out-of-court statements
if offered for their truth,4 but FRE 801(d)(2) provides a method for
1. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
2. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) (designating statements of a party, offered against that
party, as non-hearsay).
3. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(B) (designating statements that a party has manifested
adoption or belief in, when offered against that party, to be non-hearsay).
4. Id. Rule 802.
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introducing such statements if made by an opposing party.5 In the above
hypothetical, John wants to demonstrate that the accident was caused by
Susan’s intoxication through evidence of her online statements. Having
read the posts, Steve has the requisite personal knowledge needed to
establish his competency as a witness.6 However, in order for Steve to
testify to the statements contained in the Facebook posts, John has to
overcome the general hearsay exclusion. Susan’s Facebook post was
certainly made outside the courtroom, and John wants Steve to testify about
that out-of-court statement. Because Susan is an opposing party in the
litigation, FRE 801(d)(2) provides grounds for John to bring in certain outof-court statements that would generally be excluded, but that rule provides
no explicit guidance on its application to online activity.7 The relatively
recent emergence of the Internet as an avenue of communication8 raises
new evidentiary questions. Are Facebook posts “statements” as defined
under the FRE? Does “liking” someone else’s post sufficiently indicate
adoption of the substance of the post? If one hosts a document on one’s
website, does that person “manifest” a belief in the truth of the words
contained therein?
As new forms of Internet communication become more popular,
answering these questions becomes more difficult. Technological
innovation has led to new sources of out-of-court statements, making this
5. Id. Rule 801(d)(2).
6. See id. Rule 602.
7. See id. Rule 801(d)(2).
8. While the Internet has been in existence since approximately 1991, recent
developments have changed the way individuals interact with the Web. See Lev Grossman,
You—Yes, You—Are TIME’s Person of the Year, TIME (Dec. 25, 2006), http://www.time.
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570810,00.html. As one commentator noted, changes in
the Internet, referred to as “Web 2.0,” have turned the Web into a “massive social
experiment” where individuals have the ability to contribute in new ways to society. Id.
“[T]he essential difference between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 is that content creators were few
in Web 1.0 with the vast majority of users simply acting as consumers of content,” while
Web 2.0 allows anyone to create, thus democratizing online commentary. GRAHAM
CORMODE & BALACHANDER KRISHNAMURTHY, AT&T LABS-RESEARCH, KEY DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN WEB 1.0 AND WEB 2.0, at 2 (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www2.research.att.com/~bala/
papers/web1v2.pdf. These changes are not truly technological; they relate to the
“participatory nature of how a website’s content is created and delivered.” Seth P. Berman,
Lam D. Nguyen & Julie S. Chrzan, Web 2.0: What’s Evidence Between “Friends”?, 53 BOS.
B.J. 5, 5 (2009). Web 2.0 allows users to interact and create content, as well as share
information. Id. With virtually every individual possessing the capability to make online
statements, the implications of the Internet’s effect on electronic evidence are certainly
increasing.
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type of evidence increasingly important in litigation.9 Because individuals
are not likely to make online statements from the witness stand—at least
not anytime soon—the hearsay rule is of particular import in this context.10
Indeed, “[g]iven the near universal use of electronic means of
communication,” courts have often applied FRE 801(d)(2) to electronic
evidence.11
This comment analyzes the application of FRE 801(d)(2) to online
situations in order to illustrate sources of uncertainty and identify possible
solutions. The rapidly increasing use of the Internet,12 along with the
importance of electronic evidence in litigation,13 requires an examination
into the FRE’s applicability to the online world. Part II outlines the
operation of the hearsay rule and illustrates the traditional application of
FRE 801(d)(2). Part III introduces new issues in application of the hearsay
rule and FRE 801(d)(2) brought about by the Internet, and how case law has
developed in response. Part IV evaluates possible solutions to resolve the
uncertainties regarding the hearsay rule and the Internet. Finally, Part V
concludes that applying the existing FRE will provide the most satisfactory
solution to the issues presented by developing Internet technologies.
II. The Operation of the Hearsay Rule, the Policy Behind It, and the
Traditional Application of FRE 801(d)(2)
A. The Hearsay Rule, Its Applicability to Online Situations, and Its Policy
The FRE define hearsay as any “statement that: (1) the declarant does
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party
offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.”14 The FRE define a declarant as “the person who made the
statement,” and a statement as “a person’s oral assertion, written assertion,
or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.”15 In general,
9. Jonathan L. Moore, Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence
to Address the Challenges of Electronically Stored Information in Civil Litigation, 50
JURIMETRICS J. 147, 148 (2010).
10. Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 42
(2009) (“[E]lectronic evidence clearly originates out-of-court . . . .”).
11. Jonathan D. Frieden & Leigh M. Murray, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, ¶ 52 (2010) (quoting
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 568 (D. Md. 2007)).
12. See infra Part IV.A.
13. See Moore, supra note 9, at 148.
14. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
15. Id. Rule 801(a)-(b).
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hearsay statements are not admissible into evidence under the FRE.16 The
hearsay rule, while generally exclusionary, admits certain out-of-court
statements, provided they qualify under an exception in the FRE, are
permitted by other legislative or constitutional rules, or are declared not to
be hearsay by legislative enactment.17
Evaluation of online hearsay necessarily involves the consideration of
electronically stored information (ESI).18 The FRE have been held to
govern the admissibility of ESI in the same way they govern other forms of
evidence.19 While the FRE do not identify electronic evidence as a specific
category, the rules are constructed to “address technical changes not in
existence as of the codification of the rules themselves.”20 Despite
uncertainty surrounding how the FRE apply to online hearsay, it is clear
they still control in this context.21 Thus, it is important to consider
traditional hearsay principles.
The general bar against hearsay is motivated by concerns for witness
credibility, particularly with regard to four risks inherent in testimony: the
declarant’s capacity to perceive accurately, inadequate memory, ambiguity,
and fabrication.22 When testimony is given in court, these risks are
addressed in part because the statements are made under oath or
affirmation, because the fact-finder may observe the demeanor of the
16. Id. Rule 802.
17. Id.; see id. Rule 801(d).
18. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 n.5 (D. Md. 2007). As the
advisory committee notes to the 2006 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) indicate, “[t]he wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity
of technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise definition of electronically
stored information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee’s notes. FRCP 34(a), which
was amended in 2006 to explicitly authorize discovery of ESI, is intended to be interpreted
expansively and identifies “writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound
recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which
information can be obtained,” as discoverable ESI. Id. Rule 34(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added);
see also Argus & Assocs., Inc. v. Prof’l Benefits Servs., Inc., No. 08-10531, 2009 WL
1297374, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2009) (describing information stored on a claims
processing website as “clearly . . . within the definition of electronically stored
information”); Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 447-48 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(holding information stored in a computer’s random access memory was discoverable ESI).
19. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538 n.5 (citation omitted).
20. Id.
21. Cf. PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 403 (2d ed. 2008)
(noting that the application of the hearsay rule does not differ when applied to electronic
evidence, but is “made more difficult to apply because of the new context”).
22. 6 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801:1 (7th ed. 2012).
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speaker, and, most importantly, because the opposing party has an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.23 While the credibility risks are
still present during in-court testimony, out-of-court statements increase
those risks “because an out-of-court declarant is not subject to the reliability
safeguards present with in-court testimony.”24 Thus, the hearsay rule
generally excludes out-of-court statements to eliminate the risk of
inaccurate, misleading, or false testimony.25
B. Traditional Application of FRE 801(d)(2) and Its Justification
1. FRE 801(d)(2): Admitting Statements of Opposing Parties as NonHearsay
The FRE provide exceptions to the hearsay rule for certain types of
statements.26 The advisory committee notes to FRE 803 indicate that certain
hearsay statements have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that
negate the risk of using out-of-court statements for their truth.27 FRE 804
outlines other exceptions to the hearsay rule for situations where a declarant
is unavailable.28 The advisory committee justified the exceptions because,
where a declarant is unavailable to testify in court, hearsay evidence
meeting a specified standard is better than no evidence at all.29
When considering the impact of the Internet on the hearsay rule, FRE
801(d)(2) is of particular relevance.30 The rule admits the relevant
statements of a party in litigation when used against that party by an
opponent.31 FRE 801(d)(2) does not outline exceptions to the hearsay rule,
but defines a party’s out-of-court statements as “not hearsay.”32 However,
those same types of statements, if offered for their truth, fit under the

23. Id. Cross-examination is “the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth.’” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
24. Moore, supra note 9, at 166.
25. See id. at 166-67.
26. See FED. R. EVID. 803-804.
27. Id. Rule 803 advisory committee’s notes.
28. See id. Rule 804.
29. Id. Rule 804 advisory committee’s notes.
30. See Frieden & Murray, supra note 11, ¶ 52.
31. 6 GRAHAM, supra note 22, § 801:15.
32. FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
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general hearsay definition of FRE 801(c).33 This is in contrast to FRE 803
and FRE 804, which are both classified as exceptions to the hearsay rule in
their titles.34 Some have argued that FRE 801(d)’s phrasing is confusing
and inappropriate.35 The words “not hearsay” as used in the context of FRE
801(d)(2) do not carry their usual meaning; any out-of-court statement
offered for its truth is hearsay under FRE 801(c).36 The term as used in Rule
801(d) simply excludes “statements which would otherwise literally fall
within the definition” of hearsay from that definition under the FRE.37
Thus, the rule has the practical effect of the hearsay exceptions enumerated
in FRE 803 and FRE 804, but remains difficult to classify.38
The traditional application of FRE 801(d)(2) highlights areas where
controversy may arise in cases of online admissions. Prior to evaluating the
admissibility of online admissions for hearsay purposes, it is important to
consider the relevance of the proffered evidence.39 “Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would
be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining
the action.”40 In addition to the requirement of relevancy, the evidence must
also be authenticated as required by FRE 901(a): “To satisfy the
33. See id. Rule 801(c); Sam Stonefield, Rule 801(d)’s Oxymoronic “Not Hearsay”
Classification: The Untold Backstory and a Suggested Amendment, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 2
(2011).
34. See FED. R. EVID. 803-804.
35. See generally Stonefield, supra note 33 (outlining the history of Rule 801(d) and
advocating for amendment). “By labeling this admittedly hearsay evidence as something that
it is not, Rule 801(d) creates an oxymoron.” Id. at 2. While Professor Stonefield’s comments
are from before the 2011 “restyling” amendments to the FRE were enacted, his opinions
regarding FRE 801(d)’s “not hearsay” phrasing remain relevant as this characterization
survived in the amended rule. The primary change in rule 801(d)(2) was replacing the term
“admission” with “statement.” The word was replaced in the current version under the
reasoning that “[t]he term ‘admissions’ is confusing because not all statements covered by
the exclusion are admissions in the colloquial sense—a statement can be within the
exclusion even if it ‘admitted’ nothing and was not against the party’s interest when made.”
FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s notes. However, the advisory committee did not
amend the “not hearsay” language. See id. Rule 801(d).
36. Stonefield, supra note 33, at 2; see FED. R. EVID. 801(c)-(d).
37. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) advisory committee’s notes.
38. See Stonefield, supra note 33, at 51-52 (noting the United States Supreme Court has
referred to the rule as an exemption, exception, and exclusion and has avoided the phrase
“not hearsay”).
39. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (making irrelevant evidence inadmissible); see also United
States v. Davis, 826 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D.R.I. 1993) (“The initial inquiry in any evidentiary
determination of admissibility is whether the evidence is relevant.”).
40. FED. R. EVID. 401(a)-(b).
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requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.”41 In the context of statements of a
party opponent, there must be evidence that the party who is alleged to have
made the statement actually did so.42 Finally, determining the admissibility
of an opposing party’s out-of-court statements requires careful
consideration of the applicable hearsay rules.
Per FRE 801(d)(2), statements are not hearsay when:
The statement is offered against an opposing party and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative
capacity;
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to
be true;
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make
a statement on the subject;
(D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter
within the scope of that relationship and while it existed; or
(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.43
The text of FRE 801(d)(2) indicates that “there are specific foundational
facts that must be established” in determining whether a non-hearsay
statement exists.44 The trial judge determines the existence of these facts
under FRE 104(a).45 First, there must be a statement as defined by FRE
801(a), and that statement must have been made out of court.46 Second, the
statement must be attributable to a party to the litigation as outlined in the
five subparts of FRE 801(d)(2).47 Third, a “party’s out-of-court-statement
must be offered against that party.”48 Finally, as with all out-of-court
41. Id. Rule 901(a).
42. See id. Rule 801(d)(2).
43. Id.
44. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 567 (D. Md. 2007).
45. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
46. See id. Rule 801(d)(2).
47. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(A)-(E).
48. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 567 (emphasis added). A party may not rely on Rule
801(d)(2) to offer its own out-of-court statements into evidence. Rather, the rule permits one
party to offer another party’s out-of-court statement against that party-declarant. Id.
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statements, FRE 801(d)(2) is only implicated if the statement is “offer[ed]
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”49
Unlike other hearsay exceptions, “No guarantee of trustworthiness is
required in the case of an admission.”50 Because FRE 801(d)(2) concerns
either a party’s own statement or a statement the rules attribute to him, a
policy of fairness permits those statements to be used against that party:
“Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of
hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the
adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay
rule.”51 The advisory committee notes to the FRE endorse a “generous
treatment of this avenue to admissibility.”52 Due to “a party’s ability to
rebut the out-of-court statement by ‘put[ting] himself on the stand and
explain[ing] his former assertion,’” this generous treatment is justified.53
2. Application of FRE 801(d)(2) in the Non-Internet Context
In United States v. Atlas Lederer Co., a Southern District of Ohio case
arising under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, the United States government sued to recover costs
incurred in cleaning up pollution from a scrap company site.54 In the course
of that litigation, the United States wished to enter into evidence statements
by a defendant taken both from an affidavit and from answers to
interrogatories during the discovery stage of the litigation.55 The defendant
argued that the answers to the interrogatories and the affidavit statement
could not be used against him, but the court held they were admissible nonhearsay statements under FRE 801(d)(2)(A).56 Because a party made both
49. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
50. Id. Rule 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes. While this portion of the advisory
committee’s notes still uses “admission” in connection with rule 801(d)(2), this word has
been amended and replaced with “statement” in the text of the rule. See supra note 35.
Because both the committee and courts were still using “admission” when discussing FRE
801(d)(2) until late 2011, the term is featured in many of the sources quoted in this
comment. It should be equated with the current phrasing, “[a]n [o]pposing [p]arty’s
[s]tatement,” because the changes after the 2011 amendments were “intended to be stylistic
only [with] no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes.
51. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes.
52. Id.
53. Harris v. United States, 834 A.2d 106, 116 (D.C. 2003) (alterations in original)
(quoting Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 (D.C. 1988)).
54. No. 3:91CV309, 2012 WL 89976, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2012).
55. Id. at *4.
56. Id.
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statements, and because both statements were being offered against that
party, the court applied FRE 801(d)(2) to admit them into evidence.57
In Graves ex rel. W.A.G. v. Toyota Motor Corp., the Southern District of
Mississippi disallowed admission of statements because the statements did
not meet the standards of FRE 801(d)(2).58 In a products liability action
arising from a vehicle accident that caused the plaintiff severe injuries, the
plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude statements from a post-accident
medical record that included his pre-accident medical history.59 The
plaintiff contended that those statements were inadmissible hearsay because
he had no recollection of the accident and, thus, the statements concerning
his prior medical history must have come from someone else.60 The
defendant corporation countered that the statements were admissible nonhearsay statements of a party opponent because the plaintiff, or someone
speaking on his behalf, must have outlined his medical history after the
accident.61 The court was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument
because the argument unjustly relied on an assumption that the statements
were made by the plaintiff or his parents.62 The defendant did not offer
sufficient evidence to establish any source of the statements, much less that
the statements were made by the plaintiff or his parents, and the court
refused to admit the hearsay under FRE 801(d)(2) without further evidence
that the plaintiff was the declarant.63
As the courts’ evidentiary rulings in Atlas Lederer Co. and Graves ex rel.
W.A.G. show, establishing the declarant of a purported 801(d)(2) statement
is an essential determination in applying the rule. Identification in this
regard, along with the even more fundamental question of whether there has
been a statement at all, becomes further complicated in light of
technological change.

57. Id.
58. No. 2:09CV169KS-MTP, 2012 WL 73010, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012).
59. Id. at *1-3.
60. Id. at *1-2.
61. Id. at *3.
62. Id. (“[W]ithout more direct evidence of where this information came from, the court
will not assume that it was provided by [the plaintiff].”).
63. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

542

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:533

III. New Issues in the Application of FRE 801(d)(2) Brought on by
Developing Internet Technologies
While the traditional operation of FRE 801(d)(2) seems well-settled,
with “apparently prevalent satisfaction [in] the results,”64 changes in the
type of evidence being generated have raised issues in the application of
this rule. Defining the point at which online activity becomes a statement
for hearsay purposes and the method of determining that point becomes
important because of the effect those conclusions have on the admissibility
of evidence at trial.65 As one court observed, “Hearsay issues are pervasive
when electronically stored and generated evidence is introduced.”66 The
“mechanical recording of data on a Web page on the Internet does not
create hearsay,” but when an online statement “could be affected by the
human problems of perception, memory, sincerity, and ambiguity,” the
hearsay rule is implicated.67 If a statement is made online, by definition it
was not made in court.68 Thus, if online statements are offered into
evidence for their truth, the hearsay rule governs.69 Courts have had varied
responses to the issues raised by electronic and online evidence.
A. Courts’ Initial Reluctance to Accept Internet Evidence
The Internet presents a “sizable bank of information, news, and other
potentially valuable evidence to use in support of [a] case.”70 However,
many courts initially questioned the reliability of online information.71
One court addressed online evidence with what was later called “famous
skepticism.”72 In an early opinion rejecting electronic “evidence,” the
Southern District of Texas stated that “any evidence procured off the
Internet is adequate for almost nothing, even under the most liberal
interpretation of the hearsay exception rules.”73 In the case, the court
64. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s notes.
65. See id. Rule 801(c) (hearsay governs “statements”).
66. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 562 (D. Md. 2007).
67. RICE, supra note 21, at 421.
68. See United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000).
69. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
70. Theodore J. Koerth & Christopher E. Paetsch, How to Admit E-Mail and Web Pages
into Evidence, 94 ILL. B.J. 674, 675 (2006).
71. Id. at 676; see Jackson, 208 F.3d at 637; St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp,
Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
72. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 (D. Md. 2007) (citing St.
Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 774-75).
73. St. Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 775. It may be relevant to note that this opinion was
rendered by Samuel B. Kent, who has since resigned his federal judgeship following a
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addressed a plaintiff’s claim that he suffered injury on a ship allegedly
owned by the defendant.74 The defendant disputed ownership of the vessel
and the plaintiff sought to prove ownership through evidence obtained on
the United States Coast Guard’s Internet database; the court found this
evidence “totally insufficient” to successfully counter a motion to dismiss.75
The court presumed Internet information to be inherently untrustworthy
because “[a]nyone can put anything on the Internet” and “[n]o web-site is
monitored for accuracy.”76 In addition, the court viewed the Internet “as one
large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and misinformation,” without sufficient
indicia of authenticity.77 The court pointed out that any individual with
sufficient technological skill could alter online evidence remotely.78
In another early case dealing with Internet evidence, the Seventh Circuit
also rejected the admissibility of online statements as hearsay.79 In United
States v. Jackson, the defendant appealed several criminal convictions and
argued that the trial court erred by excluding web postings of white
supremacist groups claiming responsibility for the crimes.80 The proponent
argued that the postings were business records of the Internet service
provider and thus admissible under FRE 803(6).81 The Seventh Circuit,
however, found the web postings to be inadmissible hearsay because the
business record exception did not apply and the postings’ authenticity was
not sufficiently established.82

sexual abuse scandal that led to his imprisonment and the rare initiation of impeachment
proceedings in Congress. See Martha Neil, Federal Judge Samuel Kent Resigns, as Senate
Impeachment Trial Looms, A.B.A. J. (June 25, 2009, 5:05 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/federal_judge_samuel_kent_resigns_as_senate_impeachment_trial_looms/;
Stewart Powell, Judge Kent’s Impeachment Came Fast and Furious, HOUS. CHRON. (June
19, 2009), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Judge-Kent-s-impeachmentcame-fast-and-furious-1729616.php.
74. St. Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 774-75.
77. Id. at 774.
78. Id. at 775.
79. United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2000).
80. Id. at 637.
81. Id. at 637-38.
82. Id. (citing St. Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 775). The proponent of the postings argued
that they were admissible as the business records of the Internet service provider, but the
court pointed out that just because the service provider could reproduce the postings did not
make them the service provider’s business records. Id. at 637. Further, regardless of the FRE
803(6) analysis, the proponent failed to offer sufficient evidence of authenticity to satisfy
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The initial reluctance shown by these courts towards Internet evidence
has received scrutiny in recent years, notably by the District of Maine: “[I]n
the decade since Jackson, the Internet has become more familiar and
ubiquitous and its potential significance as a critical source for evidence in
some cases has escalated. A conclusion that all Internet postings are so
inherently unreliable that they are never admissible seems unwise.”83 The
Cameron court criticized Jackson for its reliance on St. Claire:
Although St. Clair still accurately describes some parts of the
Internet, the on-line world has matured in the eleven years since
that Court’s observation, and this Court is less inclined to paint
all websites with the same broad brush and exclude all Internet
postings from the business records exception to the hearsay rule
only because they are Web-based.84
Instead, the court advocated “periodic reevaluation” with reference to webbased content and the hearsay rule.85 Cameron is indicative of courts’
increasing acceptance of Internet evidence.
B. Proper Foundation: Courts’ Increasing Acceptance of Online Statements
Under FRE 801(d)(2)
Despite initial reluctance, recent cases dealing with the admissibility of
Internet statements illustrate that courts are more willing to allow these
statements into evidence.86 While courts have applied other exceptions to
the hearsay rule to admit Internet statements,87 FRE 801(d)(2) is often
considered when evaluating the admissibility of electronic evidence.88 In
FRE 901 because she did not show the postings were actually made by the white
supremacist groups. Id. at 638.
83. United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160-61 (D. Me. 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012).
84. Id. at 161.
85. Id.
86. Koerth & Paetsch, supra note 70, at 675-76 (citing U.S. EEOC v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 65 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 706, 708 (E.D. La. 2004); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (admitting
chat room log printouts, focusing on authenticity); Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple
Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 n.2 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (admitting emails under
FRE 803(3) as statements of declarant’s then-existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition), aff’d, 238 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2001); State v. Erickstad, 2000 ND 202, ¶¶ 33-34,
620 N.W. 2d 136, 145-46 (admitting online used car price guide under a market report or
commercial publication exception to hearsay rule).
88. Frieden & Murray, supra note 11, ¶ 33.
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light of the vast use of electronic communication, “[I]t is not surprising that
statements contained in electronically made or stored evidence often have
been found to qualify as admissions by a party opponent if offered against
that party.”89 However, courts’ willingness to apply FRE 801(d)(2) has
varied depending on the format of the electronic statements.
1. Emails Authored by Parties Classified as Non-Hearsay Admissions
The most “ubiquitous” form of electronic evidence considered by courts
is email: “[E]-mail evidence often figures prominently in cases where state
of mind, motive and intent must be proved, [and] it is not unusual to see a
case consisting almost entirely of e-mail evidence.”90 While emails are
“always subject to the limitations of the hearsay rule,”91 courts have often
admitted this type of online statement as a statement of a party opponent.92
In Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection &
Insurance Co., the District of Vermont classified emails of a party as nonhearsay statements.93 In a suit by an insured party against its insurer to
collect damages resulting from a defective product, the plaintiff objected to
the defendant’s use of intra-company emails authored by the plaintiff’s
employees.94 The court rejected the plaintiff’s hearsay objection, finding
those statements were “clearly admissions of a party, and therefore
admissible as non-hearsay.”95 The court’s reasoning was grounded in the
fact that the emails were authored by the party and were being offered
against that party.96
The admissibility of emails was also challenged in Schaghticoke Tribal
Nation v. Kempthorne, a case concerning whether the Schaghticoke Tribal
Nation qualified as an Indian tribe under federal law.97 During a dispute
over the extent of the case record on joint motions for summary judgment,
the plaintiffs argued that certain emails should be considered.98 However,
89. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 568 (D. Md.
2007)).
90. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 554 (citation omitted).
91. Bowe v. State, 785 So. 2d 531, 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000); Koerth &
Paetsch, supra note 70, at 675.
93. 72 F. Supp. 2d 441, 449 (D. Vt. 1999).
94. Id. at 448-49.
95. Id. at 449.
96. See id. at 448-49.
97. See 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 394, 398 (D. Conn. 2008), aff’d, 587 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
2009).
98. Id. at 394-95, 398.
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the District of Connecticut held that emails authored by a lobbying group
opposing tribal designation were inadmissible hearsay because the group
was not a party to the litigation and was not an agent of any party; thus,
FRE 801(d)(2) did not apply.99 In contrast, emails from staff members of
the government bodies being sued by the tribe were admissible under FRE
801(d)(2)(D).100 Unlike the authors of the lobbying group emails, the
staffers were employees of opposing parties and thus could speak on the
opposing parties’ behalves.101
Email evidence was also challenged in a fraud action prosecuted by a
corporation’s shareholders against the corporation and its officers and
directors.102 The defendant chief executive officer objected to the plaintiffs’
use of emails he authored as evidence.103 The emails in question were
authenticated because the parties produced them during discovery.104 The
Central District of California overruled the defendant’s argument because
“emails written by a party are admissions of a party opponent and
admissible as non-hearsay under [FRE] 801(d)(2).”105 Because the emails
were written by the defendant and offered against him by the plaintiffs, they
were admissible.106 However, the court determined other emails to be
inadmissible, including where the email merely referenced the need to
speak with a person identified by first name only, even though it was the
defendant’s first name.107 While the reference to the defendant could be
inferred, nothing in the record conclusively connected the email to the
defendant, and FRE 801(d)(2) did not apply, as the email was not shown to
be his statement or adopted statement.108
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., a copyright
infringement case brought by record companies, movie studios, and music
publishers against the distributor of file-sharing software, the defendant
objected to the use of emails as evidence.109 Each email included the names
of sender and recipient, as well as the date and time of sending.110 The
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 398.
Id.
Id.
In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
Id. at 781.
Id.; see infra text accompanying note 110.
In re Homestore.com, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
See id.
Id. at 781-82.
See id.
454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970-71 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
Id. at 971.
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emails came to light in the discovery process and were voluntarily
submitted by the defendants; thus, the court found no problem with
authenticity.111 The Central District of California admitted these emails as
statements of an opposing party under FRE 801(d)(2).112 Because the
defendant admitted to employing certain individuals, the court found all
emails sent by those employees admissible as non-hearsay under FRE
801(d)(2)(D).113 That subsection treats the statements of a “party’s agent or
employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it
existed,” as statements of the party.114 In addition, after the defendant
admitted that the email address “info@musiccity.com” was a corporate
email address, the court found “[a]ll emails sent from that address [to be]
admissible non-hearsay” under FRE 801(d)(2).115
Emails have also been admitted as adopted statements of a party.116 In
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., emails were also admitted as adoptive
statements under FRE 801(d)(2)(B): “To the extent other content is
incorporated into these emails, and to the extent the [defendant’s] agent
expresses approval thereof, the incorporated content is admissible as
vicarious adoptions.”117
Ruling on an appeal from the district court’s ruling in a suit concerning a
shipping contract dispute, the Ninth Circuit found an abuse of discretion in
the exclusion of an email from evidence.118 An employee of the plaintiff
authored the email in question, which implicated the plaintiff’s liability for
a counterclaim arising out of a delayed railroad shipment, and a second
employee subsequently forwarded it to the defendant.119 The Ninth Circuit
found that the initial composition of the email was a statement by the
plaintiff’s agent acting within the scope of employment and thus “not
hearsay” under FRE 801(d)(2)(D).120 The court of appeals also found that
the email was admissible as an adoptive admission based on the second
111. Id. at 972; see John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 106 F. Supp.
2d 462, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that a party’s self-production of documents “implicitly
authenticate[s]” them).
112. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74.
113. Id. at 971.
114. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
115. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
116. Koerth & Paetsch, supra note 70, at 675.
117. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (citing FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(B)).
118. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2002).
119. Id. at 813, 821.
120. Id. at 821.
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employee’s actions.121 The second employee copied the body of the original
email “and prefaced it with the statement, ‘Yikes, Pls [sic] note the rail
screwed us up . . . .,’” which the court found sufficient to manifest the
second employee’s adoption or belief in the truth of the original email.122
Additionally, United States v. Safavian, a federal criminal prosecution
for obstruction of justice, involved the use of numerous emails as
evidence.123 In response to the defendant’s objection on hearsay grounds,
the court determined admissibility based on different categorizations of the
emails.124 The court applied FRE 801(d)(2)(A) to admit the emails
“attributed directly to [the defendant].”125 The court also found emails
admissible when “[t]he context and content of certain e-mails
demonstrate[d] clearly that [the defendant] ‘manifested an adoption or
belief’ in the truth of the statements of other people” by forwarding them.126
However, when the defendant forwarded other emails but did not “clearly
demonstrate his adoption of the contents,” the district court did not find any
adopted statements.127
Emails typically fit neatly into the admissions doctrine.128 “[W]ritten
assertion[s]” are inherent in the composition of emails, and that clearly
makes emails “statements” under the FRE.129 Emails function much like a
conversation between sender and recipient, clearly conveying the former’s
statement in a manner that asserts a particular position.130 When considering
adopted statements, the same logic holds true. If an individual relays
another’s email without qualification or modification, it might be fair to
find the forwarder to have “manifested that [the forwarder] adopted or

121. Id.
122. Id. (second alteration in original).
123. 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D.D.C. 2006).
124. See id. at 43.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (1997) (repealed 2011)); see supra notes 35,
50.
127. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
128. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d
966, 973-74 (C.D. Cal. 2006); In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 347 F. Supp. 2d 769,
781 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
129. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
130. Goode, supra note 10, at 43 (“When someone writes an e-mail that asserts, ‘My
supervisor ordered me to cancel the contract,’ that person has made a statement . . . . For
analytical purposes, it is no different from a person handwriting or typing a letter that asserts
the same thing.”).
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believed [the original email] to be true.”131 On the other hand, forwarding
an email without an expression of approval may be insufficient to indicate
adoption.132 If the forwarder does not indicate any adoption and merely
forwards the message, the intent may not be clear; he may simply be
pointing out another’s position to the recipient.
In these situations, courts should examine the facts on a case-by-case
basis.133 To determine adoption, the court should “read each of the e-mails
with care” and determine “the context in which [the emails] should be
considered or who the senders or recipients were.”134
2. Classifying Non-Email Online Statements
While the admissions doctrine’s applicability to emails appears relatively
clear, the analysis becomes less straightforward when addressing non-email
online statements. Unlike emails, online statements like website postings do
not always function as proxies for direct communication. A primary hurdle
courts face in dealing with this type of evidence in the hearsay context
involves determining whether there was a statement at all.135 The use of
FRE 801(d)(2) in the non-email context is relevant because controversy
over the admissibility of this type of evidence often arises in litigation.136
In Van Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., the District of
Oregon considered the admissibility of statements on the website of a
defendant to a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act violation.137 Plaintiffs, the
alleged debtors, and defendants, a collection agency and the agency
president, moved for partial summary judgment; the admissibility of
statements contained on the agency’s website was at issue.138 The plaintiffs
alleged the collection agency placed misrepresentations on its website in
violation of federal law, and the defendants challenged the statements as
inadmissible hearsay.139 As an initial matter, the court found the
defendants’ website to contain “a wealth of misinformation” and, as such,
131. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 454
F. Supp. 2d at 973 (noting FRE 801(d)(2)(B) permits “content created by individuals other
than the creator of an email [that] is incorporated into the email,” to be admitted).
132. See Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 43.
135. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 564 (D. Md. 2007).
136. Id. at 555 (“Courts often have been faced with determining the admissibility of
exhibits containing representations of the contents of website postings . . . .”).
137. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093, 1109 (D. Or. 2000).
138. Id. at 1094, 1109.
139. Id. at 1108-09.
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to be relevant.140 The court ultimately found “the representations made by
[the] defendants on the website [to be] admissible as admissions of the
party-opponent under FRE 801(d)(2)(A)” because the defendants created
the website and were opposing parties.141
In deciding Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., the Central
District of California also applied the admissions doctrine to allow printouts
from a third-party website to be admitted into evidence.142 In this copyrightinfringement case, the plaintiff sought to use online evidence to show that
the defendants were affiliated with certain websites containing the alleged
infringement.143 The plaintiff sought to admit into evidence printouts from a
third-party website indicating that the defendants were associated with
those websites, which were alleged to infringe the plaintiff’s copyrights.144
The court found the printouts admissible for that purpose because they were
non-hearsay statements of an opposing party.145 The court justified this
finding under FRE 801(d)(2)(D),146 which admits statements “made by the
party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship
and while it existed.”147 Based on the reference to FRE 801(d)(2)(D), it
seems the court concluded that statements on the third-party websites
proved the existence of an agency or employment relationship between the
defendant and the third parties, although this connection is not explicitly
outlined in the opinion.148
In TIP Systems, LLC v. SBC Operations, Inc., a patent infringement
action, the Southern District of Texas admitted printouts from a party’s own
website.149 Plaintiffs owned a patent for an inmate telephone and alleged
that the defendants’ similar device infringed on their existing patent.150 To
prove the defendants were infringing based on the presence of their product
in the marketplace, plaintiffs wished to use statements from the defendant’s
website to show the defendants were in the inmate telephone business.151

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 1109.
See id.
213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
See Perfect 10, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
536 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749, 756 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
Id. at 750-51.
Id. at 756.
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Because the printouts contained statements made by a party on its own
website, the court admitted them under FRE 801(d)(2).152
Finally, United States v. Cameron included a discussion of the
applicability of FRE 801(d)(2) to images of child pornography found on a
criminal defendant’s computer.153 The court first concluded that possession
of the images was a substantive element of the crime as opposed to
evidence of it, thus negating any hearsay implications.154 The court then
considered the merits of the defendant’s hearsay arguments.155 Although the
discussion was not dispositive in the outcome of the appeal, the court
illustrated the difficulties of applying FRE 801(d)(2) in online situations.156
While the court stated that “the possession of these images could constitute
an admission by the Defendant of the commission of the crime of
possession of child pornography,” it also acknowledged uncertainty as to
whether the images were “statements” at all. 157 In a footnote, the court
again pointed out the “considerable uncertainty that surrounds how to apply
the rules of evidence to Web-based postings.”158 This discussion sheds light
on the difficulties courts face concerning the hearsay rule, FRE 801(d)(2),
and new Internet forms of communication.
A major distinction between emails and websites is that while emails
typically embody clear “written assertion[s],”159 the composition of a
website is not always an obvious assertion as required by FRE 801(a).160
Courts have generally accepted that emails contain statements.161 However,
as the court pointed out in Cameron, classifying online content under the

152. See id. at 756 n.5.
153. 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D. Me. 2011) (focusing on the testimonial nature of
reports submitted to tip-off the Internet service provider regarding defendant’s suspected
child pornography activity in the context of the Confrontation Clause), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds, 669 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012).
154. Id. at 158-60.
155. See id. at 159-62.
156. See id. at 162.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 162 n.6.
159. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
160. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 564 (D. Md. 2007) (“Cases
involving electronic evidence often raise the issue of whether electronic writings constitute
‘statements’ under Rule 801(a).”).
161. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 821 (9th Cir.
2002); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 973-74
(C.D. Cal. 2006); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2006);
Koerth & Paetsch, supra note 70, at 675.
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existing rules is more difficult.162 This ambiguity increases when
considering content generated on social networking sites.163
3. Lack of a Clear Rule for Internet Hearsay and Social Networking
Large portions of the population regularly use social networking
websites.164 These types of online portals “are effective for facilitating
communication,
conveying
autobiographical
information,
and
165
consequently, collecting evidence.” Despite the sites’ wide use, “federal
case law regarding the admissibility of social networking web sites is
limited,” and no clear rule has emerged regarding this type of electronic
evidence.166 Courts addressing social networking sites have been skeptical,
in part due to hearsay concerns.167
Content on social networking sites differs from that of emails or
traditional website postings.168 The primary distinction between these types
of online statements can be found in the directness of the communication.
On a spectrum between communications limited in scope and those with
unlimited reach, emails fall more in line with the former. Emails represent
direct communications from senders, who “generally know with whom they
are communicating” because senders address messages to exclusive lists of
recipients.169 Traditional websites occupy the opposite end of the spectrum
because they are widely viewable by anyone with Internet access. To access
a traditional website, “[a] user may either type the address of a known page
or enter one or more keywords into a commercial ‘search engine’ in an
effort to locate sites.”170
Social networking posts fall somewhere between emails and traditional
websites on this spectrum: “Social networking sites and blogs are
sophisticated tools of communication where the user voluntarily provides

162. See Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 162 n.6.
163. See Kathrine Minotti, The Advent of Digital Diaries: Implications of Social
Networking Web Sites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1057, 1060-61 (2009).
164. See infra Part IV.A.
165. Minotti, supra note 163, at 1058.
166. Id. at 1066.
167. Id.
168. See Carolyn Elefant, The “Power” of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practices
for Utilities Engaging Social Media, 32 ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 (2011) (“[S]ocial media is a catch
phrase that describes technology that facilitates interactive information, user-created content
and collaboration.”).
169. See Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 436-37 (Md. 2009).
170. Id. at 436 n.1 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852-53 (1997)).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/5

2013]

COMMENT

553

information that the user wants to share with others.”171 Users can choose
who, among other users, has access to their postings. However, the average
Facebook user has 120 “friends” who have access to his postings.172 While
a social networking profile is not typically viewable to the world like a
traditional website, the number of people with access to postings is far
greater than the typically limited recipients of an email.
The unique type and scope of communications on social networking sites
make these communications distinguishable from emails and website
postings. Approaches taken by courts to determine admissibility of hearsay
on websites or in emails are not easily applied to social networking, a new
category of online communication. These distinctions are one reason that
no clear rule applicable to social networking hearsay has been
established.173 The Supreme Court’s holding in Janus Capital Group, Inc.
v. First Derivative Traders174 increased the uncertainty surrounding the
admissibility of these different forms of online hearsay.175
C. The Impact of Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders
1. The Court’s Opinion
Janus involved an action for violation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Rule 10b-5.176 This rule “prohibits ‘mak[ing] any untrue
statement of a material fact’ in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.”177 Janus Capital Group, Inc. (JCG), a publicly-traded mutual
fund manager, organized its mutual funds into a business trust entitled the
Janus Investment Fund (JIF), a separate legal entity owned by
shareholders.178 The controversy in Janus arose after the shareholder171. Id. at 438 n.3; see supra note 8.
172. See Primates on Facebook, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 26th, 2009), http://www.
economist.com/node/13176775?story_id=13176775.
173. Cf. Minotti, supra note 163, at 1057, 1059 (noting the absence of a clear rule for
social media, as well as the presence of “complicated discovery requests and unique
admissibility hurdles” presented by the “latest Internet developments”).
174. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
175. See Gregory P. Joseph, Internet and Email Evidence (Part 1), PRAC. LAW., Feb.
2012, at 19, 29 [hereinafter Joseph, Internet Evidence] (noting that in light of Janus, “the
fact that a litigant posts on its website material from another website may not constitute an
admission as to the contents of the second website, depending on the purpose of the
posting”); Gregory P. Joseph, Supreme Court on Civil Practice 2011, 80 U.S.L.W. 250, 251
(Aug. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Joseph, Supreme Court 2011].
176. 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
177. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010)).
178. Id.
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owners of JIF hired JCG’s wholly owned subsidiary, Janus Capital
Management LLC (JCM), to advise and administer JIF’s investments.179 At
issue in the case were prospectuses issued by JIF “describing the
investment strategy and operations of its mutual funds to investors.”180 JCG
shareholders sued both JCG and JCM, alleging that prospectuses issued by
JIF materially misled the public in violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 and that
JCM was responsible because it advised JIF to issue those statements.181
After concluding that, “[f]or purposes of [SEC] Rule 10b-5, the maker of a
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement,”
the Court found that JIF was responsible for making the statements because
it filed the prospectuses with the SEC, regardless of the fact that JCM may
have advised JIF on the contents of the statements.182
In holding for JCG, the Court also rejected the shareholders’ argument
that JCM made the misleading statements by hosting JIF’s prospectuses on
its website.183 The Court found that “[m]erely hosting a document on a Web
site does not indicate that the hosting entity adopts the document as its own
statement.”184 In hosting JIF’s prospectuses, JCM did not “make” any of the
statements found in those documents, just as the SEC does not “make” any
of the statements found in documents hosted on its website.185 Ultimately,
the Court held “that only a speaker or person with ultimate authority for
content of an allegedly fraudulent statement may be held liable for damages
under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 for ‘making’ the
statement.”186
2. Possible Impact of Janus on the Application of FRE 801(d)(2) to
Online Statements
Hearsay is not directly addressed in Janus.187 The Court’s holding was
primarily a substantive one relating to the charged securities fraud.188
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2300.
181. Id. at 2300-01. First Derivative Traders argued that, as the parent company of JCM,
“JCG should be held liable for the acts of JCM as a ‘controlling person.’” Id. at 2301
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (Supp. V 2011)).
182. Id. at 2302, 2304.
183. Id. at 2305 n.12.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251.
187. Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court addressed a securities-specific issue . . . .”); see Janus
Capital Grp. Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2296.
188. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251.
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However, the Court’s determination that hosting documents on a website is
not equivalent to the host adopting the content of those documents may
influence evidentiary rulings regarding the admissions doctrine and online
statements. “Janus teaches that, depending on the circumstances, the fact
that a litigant posts on its website material from another source may not
constitute an adoption of the contents of the posted material.”189 This case
raises questions about the application of FRE 801(d)(2), particularly in the
context of adoptive admissions.
While the ruling centered on who was ultimately responsible for the
prospectuses, the Court explicitly addressed the question of whether JCM
“adopt[ed] the document[s] as its own statement,” and ruled that hosting did
not constitute making a statement.190 When considering the Court’s holding
in the context of FRE 801(d)(2)(B), the implication is that JCM’s hosting of
documents may not have been a “statement” for hearsay purposes191 or, in
the alternative, that merely hosting documents on a website is insufficient to
manifest adoption or a belief in the truth of those documents.192
Janus highlighted the difficulties courts experience when determining
whether a statement was made online. Under similar facts in Van
Westrienen, the District of Oregon held that fraudulent statements were
made when “a wealth of misinformation” was placed by a defendant-debt
collections company on its website and admitted those statements under
FRE 801(d)(2).193 The TIP Systems court also admitted statements from a
website under FRE 801(d)(2) because it found the statements to have been
made by the party.194 In both cases, information on a party’s website was
found to be a statement; yet, in Janus, the Court found no statement had
been made when JCM hosted documents on its website.195
In addition, the Court’s analysis in Janus raises questions about online
adoption of another’s statements.196 Courts have recognized adoption in
cases where individuals have forwarded emails, so long as there was
189. Id.
190. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2302, 2304, 2305 n.12.
191. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (“‘Statement’ means a person’s oral assertion, written
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.”).
192. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(B).
193. Van Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109
(D. Or. 2000).
194. TIP Sys., LLC v. SBC Operations, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 745, 756 n.5 (S.D. Tex.
2008).
195. Compare Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n.12, with TIP Sys., LLC, 536
F. Supp. 2d at 756 n.5, and Van Westrienen, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1109.
196. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251.
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sufficient manifestation of the forwarder’s adoption or belief in the truth of
the original message.197 When forwarding an email, the forwarder typically
takes a message created by another and relays that message from his email
account. This process is analogous to linking or hosting another’s document
on a website; in the hosting context, the host places another’s content in an
area the host controls. Yet in Janus, the hosting conduct was not given the
same treatment applied by other courts to email adoptions.198 The Court’s
grounds for this distinction are not exceptionally clear, likely due to the
ancillary nature of this particular inquiry to the case; but, as the Safavian
court found in the email context, without clear demonstration of intent to
adopt, there is no adoption.199
While the Janus Court did not speak explicitly in the context of hearsay
or FRE 801(d)(2), the holding implicates evidentiary concerns.200 The
Court’s restrictive view of Internet statements and adoptions in the online
context contrasts with several lower court opinions that permit such
evidence as non-hearsay admissions.201 The limited federal case law on the
issue, the absence of clear admissibility rules, the silence of the FRE
regarding online hearsay, and the Janus holding all point to the necessity of
considering the implications of Internet communications on FRE 801(d)(2),
and what approaches could be taken to address these uncertainties.
IV. Impact of Changes in Online Communication Technologies on the
Applicability of FRE 801(d)(2) to Online Statements
The two primary issues concerning the application of FRE 801(d)(2) to
Internet activity are: (1) defining what online conduct constitutes a
statement for hearsay purposes and (2) deciding how to determine what is
sufficient to indicate adoption of statements online. The development of
Internet technology has already prompted numerous discussions regarding
197. See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 43 (D.D.C. 2006).
198. Compare Janus Capital Grp., Inc, 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n.12, with Safavian, 435 F.
Supp. 2d at 43.
199. See Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
200. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251.
201. Compare Janus Capital Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2305 (finding no statement made
for purposes of fraud on party’s website), with United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d
152, 162 (D. Me. 2011) (discussing that possession of child pornography on a party’s
computer could be an admission of committing the crime of possession), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part on other grounds, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012), and TIP Sys., LLC v. SBC
Operations, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 745, 756 n.5 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that a statement
had been made by the party on its website that constituted an admission).
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the general admissibility of online evidence.202 However, in light of the
expanding ability of individuals to contribute to online communities and the
resulting new forms of statements, further consideration of FRE 801(d)(2)
is required.
A. The Proliferation of Internet Use and Its Effect on Hearsay Evidence
The proliferation of Internet use will undoubtedly lead to a surge in
attempts to use electronic evidence. The Internet is used in connection with
business transactions and, increasingly, with social relationships. One area
of major growth in online activity is in social networking: “The world has
embraced social networking with a fervor rarely seen.”203 As of December
2012, one billion people were considered “active users” of Facebook, with
over half of those users logging on every day,204 and Twitter had 200
million monthly active users.205 With online conduct occurring at such a
high rate, there is an increasing probability that Internet content will come
under courts’ scrutiny.
A number of recent cases illustrate the impact of wide Internet use on
litigation.206 This effect is strong in the evidentiary context “as social
networking sites so often offer up gold nuggets of evidence.”207 Crossexamination was permitted regarding a Facebook profile, a personal injury
claim was called into question because of photos indicating physical fitness,
a child-custody battle was lost due to inappropriate online posts, and a
husband’s position in a divorce case was compromised by a profile post
stating he was single.208
Online statements are also utilized in criminal prosecutions.209 Internet
profiles repeatedly cause increases in lengths of criminal sentences when
they show convicted persons being unremorseful.210 In addition, “police
202. See, e.g., Frieden & Murray, supra note 11; Goode, supra note 10; Joseph, Internet
Evidence, supra note 175.
203. Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal Implications of Social Networking, 22 REGENT U. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2009-2010).
204. Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsArea
Id=22 (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). Approximately 82% of “monthly active users are located
outside the U.S. and Canada.” Id.
205. @twitter, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/twitter/status/281051652235087872 (last
visited Mar. 10, 2013).
206. See generally Nelson et al., supra note 203.
207. Id. at 11.
208. Id. at 11-13 (summarizing cases).
209. Id. at 12.
210. See id. at 12-13.
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often use social networking sites in their investigations.”211 In one case, a
witness identified a first-degree murder suspect through a photograph
posted online; additionally, police have used fake names to collect evidence
from possible criminals.212
These examples illustrate the impact of increased Internet use in the legal
field. As a result, the uncertainty regarding admissibility of online hearsay
is a pressing issue.213 Indeed, “[s]ocial networking has often outpaced . . .
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,”214 including FRE
801(d)(2); the changes in Internet use increase the need to reexamine how
FRE 801(d)(2) applies to online hearsay.
B. The Increased Outlets for Making Online Statements
The hearsay rule is concerned with out-of-court statements, and online
statements are certainly ones made outside a courtroom.215 The value of
social networking can be found in the “new ways to communicate and share
information” that these sites create.216 Implicit in this new form of
communication is a new method of making statements online, and Web 2.0
has given this ability to the general public.217 Facebook allows individuals
to make online posts, upload photos, share links, and “like” posts.218 Twitter
allows individuals to post “tweets” consisting of 140 characters or less to
share information.219 Twitter also allows users to “retweet” another user’s
posts, which effectively re-posts what the other user posted on the

211. Id. at 13.
212. Vesna Jaksic, Litigation Clues Are Found on Facebook, NAT’L L.J. (N.Y.C.), Oct.
15, 2007, at 1, available at http://vesnajaksic.com/?page_id=35.
213. Kathleen Elliott Vinson, The Blurred Boundaries of Social Networking in the Legal
Field: Just “Face” It, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 355, 373 (2010) (“As the legal field grapples with
the growth and prevalence of social networking, there do not yet seem to be bright lines
clarifying the legal issues involved and social networking often outpaces and changes the
law itself.”).
214. Id. at 373 n.70.
215. See FED. R. EVID. 802; Goode, supra note 10 (“[E]lectronic evidence clearly
originates out-of-court . . . .”).
216. See Vinson, supra note 213, at 356 n.2.
217. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
218. See How to Post & Share, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/13237
1443506290/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013); Like, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
110920455663362/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
219. About, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
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“retweeting” user’s profile.220 The “retweet” feature and the ability to post
links or “like” posts on a Facebook page implicate the adopted statements
provision in FRE 801(d)(2)(B).
While some instances of online postings may present obvious statements
for hearsay purposes, such as a party authoring an email or posting his own
statement on his own website,221 there are many other circumstances where
the line is unclear. When an individual shares a link on Facebook, “likes”
another’s post, or “retweets” another’s post on Twitter, the admissibility of
that out-of-court statement will depend on whether a court treats that act as
“making” a statement, adopting a statement, or neither. The Supreme
Court’s holding in Janus illustrates that “[p]osting, alone, may be
insufficient to manifest adoption.”222
While “lawyers [are] always slower than the general public to adopt new
technology,”223 justice requires development of an even and defined process
for determining the admissibility of online hearsay under FRE 801(d)(2).
The current state of the law in this area threatens uneven application of FRE
801(d)(2) in online circumstances. Several approaches could be undertaken
to ensure consistent application of FRE 801(d)(2) to online hearsay.
C. Approaches to Applying FRE 801(d)(2) to Online Communications
Developing Internet-communication technologies have raised two issues
as to admissibility of online statements under FRE 801(d)(2). First, there is
ambiguity in identifying what constitutes a statement in the online context.
This question is often raised in courts’ evaluation of admissibility,224 yet no
clear answer has emerged. Under the current definition of a statement in the
FRE, a court must determine whether there was an “oral assertion, written
assertion, or nonverbal conduct . . . intended [to be] an assertion.”225 This
analysis becomes muddled when applied to new forms of online
statements.226 Going forward, the evidentiary analysis relating to Internet
hearsay and FRE 801(d)(2) should take into account the distinction between

220. FAQs About Retweets (RT), TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitterbasics/topics/109-tweets-messages/articles/77606-what-is-retweet-rt (last visited Mar. 10,
2013).
221. See supra Part III.B.
222. Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251.
223. Nelson et al., supra note 203, at 1.
224. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 564 (D. Md. 2007).
225. FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
226. Moore, supra note 9, at 168 (citing RICE, supra note 21, at 403).
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clear statements such as emails and online conduct not as easily defined as
an assertion.
Once an effective definition of an online statement is settled on, the
second issue to be addressed is determining when an individual has, in fact,
made or adopted an online statement for purposes of the admissions
doctrine. While the Supreme Court indicated that posting alone might not
suffice to indicate adoption, it offered no direct guidance as to when an
online statement is made or adopted.227 The admissibility of online hearsay
can be properly evaluated only when both the definition of an Internet
statement is settled and the point at which an online statement has been
made or adopted is articulated.
One way to handle the new challenges posed by the proliferation of
Internet use and the resulting online-hearsay implications is to maintain the
status quo by liberally interpreting the existing FRE when applying them to
online statements.228 Another approach is to amend the FRE to
accommodate the changing environment.229
1. Option One: Maintaining the Status Quo by Applying the Current
Rules to Online Situations
When determining the admissibility of online evidence, some courts
have simply applied the existing FRE.230 In such cases, courts have not seen
a significant difference between online statements and traditional
statements in their admissibility, and have simply applied the existing
hearsay rules.231 In the context of FRE 801(d)(2), this approach is widely
used when dealing with emails.232 As a form of communication, emails are
analogous to older practices such as letter-writing or one-on-one
227. Cf. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2305 (2011)
(finding an online posting was not a statement for purposes of securities fraud).
228. See Moore, supra note 9, at 168 (noting that some courts “recognize how
commonplace electronic information is and . . . liberally interpret the hearsay rules to ensure
its admissibility”).
229. Cf. id. at 186 (arguing for amendment of the business records exception to the
hearsay rule).
230. See id. at 168.
231. See Microware Sys. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 n.2
(S.D. Iowa 2000) (admitting emails under FRE 803(3) as statements of declarant’s thenexisting mental, emotional, or physical condition), aff’d, 238 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2001); Van
Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1109 (D. Or. 2000)
(admitting online statements as admissions of a party opponent); State v. Erickstad, 2000
ND 202, ¶¶ 32-34, 620 N.W. 2d 136, 145 (admitting online used car price guide under a
market report or commercial publication exception to hearsay rule).
232. See supra Part III.B.1.
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conversing; thus, courts have little difficulty applying the current FRE to
this type of online statement.233
This approach is supported in a number of legal commentaries.234 In The
Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, Professor Steven Goode argues “that
the current framework provided by the rules of evidence is adequate to the
task” of accommodating electronic evidence.235 Professor Goode notes that
despite the FRE being drafted “in the 1960s, well before computers, e-mail,
the internet, and digital cameras became commonplace in American life,”
they surprisingly “provide a fairly good evidentiary framework for
addressing the admissibility issues raised by the proliferation of new
technologies.”236 To support his conclusion, Professor Goode first provides
insight into courts’ “predictable pattern” when evaluating the admissibility
of evidence generated through new technology, noting historic examples of
“initial judicial intransigence eventually yield[ing] to grudging acceptance”
and ultimately resulting in courts’ comfort with admissibility.237 To
illustrate this pattern playing out with Internet evidence, Professor Goode
points to the “judicial recalcitrance” exhibited by the St. Clair court and the
less antagonistic approach of other courts, concluding that “admissibility
decisions concerning this type of evidence will follow the same trajectory”
as those of the past.238
Regarding hearsay, Professor Goode argues that the “issues that arise in
connection with electronic evidence are much simpler” and the analysis
should function in the same way as it does with other out-of-court
statements.239 After pointing to the frequent use of FRE 801(d)(2) to admit
Internet evidence, attention is drawn to the ambiguity surrounding who
makes or adopts statements online; Professor Goode advises that “[c]ontext

233. See id.
234. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 10, at 43; Joseph, Internet Evidence, supra note 175, at
19.
235. Goode, supra note 10, at 2.
236. Id. at 2-3.
237. Id. at 4. Professor Goode outlines courts’ initial reluctance to accept photographs,
recorded conversations, and motion pictures based both on concerns for inaccurate or
misleading evidence and on the absence of applicable case law dealing with those
technologies. Id. (citing Cunningham v. Fair Haven & Westville R.R., 43 A. 1047, 1049
(Conn. 1899); State v. Simon, 174 A. 867, 872 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1934), aff’d, 178 A. 728 (N.J.
1935); JORDAN S. GRUBER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE § 8:1 (1995)).
238. Id. at 5-6.
239. Id. at 42. Using email as an example, Professor Goode asserts that the hearsay
analysis is no different from that of a handwritten or typed letter. Id. at 42-43.
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will often be important in determining whether” a statement has been made
or adopted on a website.240
In another commentary supporting application of the current FRE,
Gregory P. Joseph acknowledges the changes brought about by the Internet:
“The explosive growth of the Internet, electronic mail, text messaging, and
social networks is raising a series of novel evidentiary issues.”241 Joseph’s
response is to point out that “[t]he novelty of the evidentiary issues arises
out of the novelty of the media—thus, it is essentially factual,” as opposed
to legal, novelty.242 In light of this distinction, Joseph argues that any issues
raised by Internet evidence “can be resolved by relatively straightforward
application of existing principles in a fashion very similar to the way they
are applied to other computer-generated evidence and to more traditional
exhibits.”243 With regard to FRE 801(d)(2), Joseph states that “[w]ebsite
data published by a litigant comprise admissions of that litigant when
offered by an opponent.”244 Joseph seems to agree with Professor Goode’s
propositions that the current FRE provide the necessary tools to evaluate
the admissibility of Internet hearsay and that, as a result, the current
evidentiary regime should be maintained.245
Applying the current rules to newly emerging technology also finds
support in the FRE themselves. Specific to the issue of defining a statement
online, the advisory committee’s notes to FRE 801(a) may provide
guidance: “The key to the [‘statement’] definition is that nothing is an
assertion unless intended to be one.”246 Under the advisory committee’s
current interpretation of the rules, “all evidence of conduct, verbal or
nonverbal, not intended as an assertion” is excluded.247 As to adoption
online, the text of FRE 801(d)(2)(B) specifically references a manifestation
of intent to adopt.248 Thus, FRE 801 may provide sufficient guidance for
application of the existing rules to online situations, so long as the “factual

240. Id. at 45-47.
241. Joseph, Internet Evidence, supra note 175, at 19.
242. Id. Joseph notes that “[t]he applicable legal principles are familiar—[electronic]
evidence must be authenticated and, to the extent offered for its truth, it must satisfy hearsay
concerns.” Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 29.
245. Compare id. at 19, with Goode, supra note 10, at 43.
246. FED R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s notes.
247. Id.
248. See id. Rule 801(d)(2)(B).
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novelty” identified by Joseph249 does not cause deviation from the rules’
traditional applications.250
In addition, FRE 102, which outlines the purpose of the rules, advises
that “[t]hese rules should be construed so as to . . . promote the
development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination.”251 One commentator on the general nature of
the rules observed: “[T]he drafters intended that the Federal Rules’
generality and flexibility should perpetuate. . . . [T]he Advisory Committee
intended to give trial courts the maneuverability to craft [their] rulings to do
individual justice.”252 Part of the flexibility entrenched in the rules is “the
unique position of the trial judge, who observes the context in which
particular evidentiary issues arise and who is therefore in the best position
to weigh the potential benefits and harms accompanying the admission of
particular evidence.”253 When applying these flexibility principles in the
context of the Internet and FRE 801(d)(2), the rules contemplate that trial
judges will be able to overcome difficult admissibility questions by
applying the general policies of truth-seeking and justice.254
Inherent in the rules’ flexibility, however, is a possibility of
inconsistency in application.255 Because of the general phrasing of the rules,
“[I]t is sometimes hard to predict just how much proof a particular judge
will require to admit a particular piece of electronic evidence.”256 Some
courts have struggled with applying the current rules to online situations.257
In light of Janus, there is a possibility that these struggles may increase.
While the Van Westrienen court applied the current rules to admit webpage
249. Joseph, Internet Evidence, supra note 175, at 19.
250. See Goode, supra note 10, at 45-47.
251. FED. R. EVID. 102.
252. Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74
IOWA L. REV. 413, 457-58 (1989) (footnote omitted) (“The Committee was comprised of
former and practicing trial lawyers who understood the nature of jury trials and believed that
drafting acceptable specific rules to answer most evidence questions was impossible.”
(footnote omitted)).
253. David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
937, 956-57 (1990).
254. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
255. See Goode, supra note 10, at 6-7.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 n.6 (D. Me. 2011)
(noting that classifying conduct under existing rules is difficult), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
on other grounds, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012); Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D.
534, 564 (D. Md. 2007) (discussing the difficulty in determining whether online posts are
statements for hearsay purposes).
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postings as statements of an opposing party, the Supreme Court found that
no statement was made by hosting documents online.258 Further, applying
the current rules may become even more difficult as new technologies
emerge.259 These new situations cause judges “to resolve evidentiary
concerns in contexts they have not seen before.”260 Professor Goode
explains that courts have been faced with this difficulty before and
satisfactory solutions have nonetheless emerged;261 but these solutions, at
least in light of defining online statements and adoptions, have yet to come
into clear focus.
With the flexibility of the rules as designed, the questions of what online
conduct constitutes a statement for hearsay purposes, and what is sufficient
for adoption online, remain somewhat unanswered. If this approach is
adopted going forward, it must be premised on the assumption that courts
will adapt to new technologies and develop clear and uniform admissibility
rules for new Internet hearsay.
2. Option Two: Amending the FRE to Accommodate Internet
Communications
Another approach to solving the new issues presented by online hearsay
is to amend the FRE.262 In Time for an Upgrade: Amending the Federal
Rules of Evidence to Address the Challenges of Electronically Stored
Information in Civil Litigation, Jonathan L. Moore begins by observing that
there have been no changes to the FRE in response to ESI, while the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) have been amended to address
concerns over e-discovery.263 Moore prefaces his argument by detailing the
“vast technological and societal changes” brought on by the increased
influence of computer technology.264 Moore argues that, in the absence of
258. See supra Parts III.B.2, III.C. Compare Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2305 n.12 (2011), with Van Westrienen v. Americontinental
Collection Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093, 1109 (D. Or. 2000) (illustrating contrasting
results in evaluations of online postings as statements).
259. See RICE, supra note 21, at 492.
260. Id.
261. Goode, supra note 10, at 4; see supra note 237.
262. Moore, supra note 9, at 186.
263. Id. at 147.
264. Id. at 147-48. “The changes brought by this technology pervade all aspects of
modern life, ‘chang[ing] almost everything about our relationship with information: how we
create it, how much of it we create, how it is stored, who sees it, [and] how and when we
dispose of it.’” Id. at 148 (alterations in original) (quoting James Gibson, A Topic Both
Timely and Timeless, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 49, ¶ 2 (2004)).
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relevant changes to the FRE, “[F]ederal courts have used vastly differing
admissibility standards” when dealing with electronic evidence; thus,
amendments to the FRE are necessary “to provide clarity and
uniformity.”265 While pointing out that the existing FRE “are flexible
enough to accommodate the changes brought by ESI,”266 Moore ultimately
concludes amendments are necessary:
Even with this flexibility, some of the changes wrought by
technology have no common law analog, making it difficult for
judges to resolve them. Additionally, the current rules are
premised on the concept of written, physical evidence, a concept
that technological changes have significantly altered in the new
millennium. These changes necessitate the reconsideration of the
traditional rules of evidence.267
In his article, Moore provides textual changes to a number of rules, but
does not directly address changes to FRE 801(d)(2).268 However, his
observations regarding the sweeping societal changes brought on by
technology, and the accompanying judicial uncertainty,269 are equally
present with regard to FRE 801(d)(2).270 Thus, his suggestion of
amendment may still be applicable.
As Moore observes, amending federal rules to accommodate technology
is not unprecedented.271 In 2006, the FRCP were amended in response to
increasing concerns over the discoverability of ESI.272 The primary issues
surrounding electronic discovery prior to the 2006 FRCP were the sheer
volume of ESI and the resulting increase in the cost of litigation.273 The
265. Id.
266. Id. at 175.
267. Id. at 176 (footnotes omitted).
268. See id. at 175-93.
269. See id. at 147-48.
270. See supra Part III.
271. Moore, supra note 9, at 177.
272. Bennett B. Borden et al., Four Years Later: How the 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules Have Reshaped the E-Discovery Landscape and Are Revitalizing the Civil
Justice System, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶ 6 (2011); see also Moore, supra note 9, at 149.
273. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 563 (2010) (“The volume and costs of discovery in the
electronic age amount in some cases to billions of pages and millions of dollars.”); Mia
Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting and Shifting the Costs
of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 5 (2007)
(“The sheer magnitude and diversity of ESI that must be dealt with creates significant
difficulties and costs for lawyers and litigants.”); George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron,
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inherent characteristics of ESI contributed to the burdens on the litigation
system: ESI is (1) “dynamic” in that it can be easily modified, (2)
“persistent” because attempts to destroy it can often be undone, (3)
“dependent upon the technology that created it,” and (4) available in many
different forms, making discovery difficult.274
The burdens of ESI discovery on the efficiency and cost of litigation
directly conflicted with FRCP 1, which requires that the FRCP “‘be
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.’”275 Without clear guidance from procedural
rules, courts applied local rules and case law, rather than meeting the
mandate of FRCP 1; this led to inconsistent results “and a confusing and
debilitating federal civil judicial system.”276
In response, “the Advisory Committee first proposed the Amendments
‘to reduce the costs of [electronic] discovery, to increase [discovery’s]
efficiency, to increase uniformity of practice, and to encourage the judiciary
to participate more actively in case management.’”277 Further, “[t]he
Advisory Committee solicited extensive input from ‘bar organizations,
attorneys, computer specialists, and members of the public,’”278 and
concluded that amendment of the FRCP was needed because, without
uniform rules, “a patchwork of rules and requirements [was] likely to
develop” in courts across the country.279 Without top-down change “to
accommodate the distinctive features of electronic discovery . . . similarly
situated litigants will . . . be treated differently depending on the federal

Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶ 1 (2007)
(noting that the inflation of the quantity of information “has stressed the legal system and
indeed, it is becoming prohibitively expensive for lawyers even to search through
information”).
274. Mazza et al., supra note 273, ¶ 4.
275. Id. ¶ 1 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
276. See Borden et al., supra note 272, ¶ 7 (citing COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 22-24 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf).
277. Id. ¶ 8 (first alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair,
Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to David F. Levi, Chair, Standing
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-2005.pdf).
278. Id. ¶ 6 (quoting COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 276, at
22).
279. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 276, at 23.
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forum.”280 Upon approval by the Supreme Court, the amendments were
incorporated in 2006.281
The substantive changes to the discovery rules included, among others,
defining ESI as discoverable information, limiting the discoverability of
certain sources of ESI absent good cause, defining appropriate formats for
the delivery of ESI, and establishing who pays for electronic discovery.282
The 2006 amendments focused the scope of discovery by requiring
discovering parties “to consider the evidence they need, where it is located,
and how to acquire it in a way that is fair and proportional to the needs of
the case.”283 The burden imposed by vast quantities of available information
was mitigated under the 2006 amendments because parties are now
encouraged “to seek only the information that is necessary for the
resolution of the case.”284 As a result, courts and attorneys are becoming
“increasingly adept at using the tools the Amendments provide to craft
discovery protocols that are reasonable, iterative, and proportional to the
needs of the case,” thus meeting FRCP 1’s call for speedy and inexpensive
litigation.285
If amending the FRE to address changes brought on by Internet evidence
is an appropriate response, the process and reasoning by which the FRCP
were amended would provide valuable guidance. However, no concrete
proposals to amend FRE 801(d)(2) have emerged to address the issues of
what online conduct constitutes a statement for hearsay purposes and when
an online statement has been adopted. Given the explicit purpose of the
FRE and the expectancy by the drafters that the rules would remain general
and flexible,286 it is difficult to imagine creating particular rules to define
what online conduct constitutes a statement or at what point an adoption has
been made online. To answer these questions in the text of a rule,
amendments would have to be extremely issue specific, which would
contravene the rules’ underlying policy of adaptability. Adding additional
Internet-specific hearsay rules may conflict with the recent streamlining
amendments to the FRE.
280. Id. at 24.
281. Borden et al., supra note 272, ¶ 6.
282. See Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in
Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 521 (2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B),
34(a)(1)(A), 34(b)(1)(C), (2)(E); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s notes).
283. See Borden et al., supra note 272, ¶ 10.
284. Id.
285. Id. ¶ 11.
286. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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While amending the FRE might provide a more concrete answer to the
admissibility issues presented by Internet hearsay, doing so may directly
conflict with the designed adaptability of the rules. While, in the short-term,
amending the FRE may provide a clear and concise definition of an online
statement or adoption, any such change could become obsolete with further
technological advancement. Amending the FRE to reflect the current state
of technology could lead to an endless stream of changes that would
ultimately lead to more confusion in the future.
D. The Appropriateness, Despite Technological Change, of Maintaining the
Current Approach to FRE 801(d)(2)
1. Sufficiency of the Evidentiary Status Quo to Developing Adequate
Definitions Applicable to Online Conduct and FRE 801(d)(2)
The expansion of online communication methods is particularly
impactful with regard to the hearsay rule and the admissions doctrine.287 As
one court pointed out, “Given the near universal use of electronic means of
communication, it is not surprising that statements contained in
electronically made or stored evidence often have been found to qualify as
admissions by a party opponent.”288 Because this new type of evidence
proves apt for application of FRE 801(d)(2), these technological changes
require important consideration.
Ultimately, maintaining the evidentiary status quo by liberally
interpreting existing rules in the case of Internet statements provides the
most efficient and satisfactory response to new admissibility concerns. As
history has shown, the FRE were designed to be flexible to new
technological changes. Thus, amending them to adapt to new technology
would contravene their stated purpose.
Professor Goode’s explanation of courts’ past responses to technological
change provides compelling support to the proposition that any current
difficulty with the admissibility of Internet evidence may be relatively
short-lived.289 While the current definition for what online conduct
constitutes a statement for hearsay purposes may be unclear to courts, FRE
801 provides sufficient guidance to eventually develop such a definition.
The key is whether the online conduct was intended as an assertion. For
adoptions, the online conduct must manifest belief in the truth of the
adopted statement. While Janus may have clouded the issue of online
287. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 563 (D. Md. 2007).
288. Id. at 568.
289. Goode, supra note 10, at 4; see supra note 237.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss3/5

2013]

COMMENT

569

adoptions, the Court’s decision still reflects the spirit of FRE 801(d)(2)(B):
“Posting, alone, may be insufficient to manifest adoption.”290 Rule
801(d)(2)(B) supports this conclusion by requiring not only posting, but
also clearly indicated intent to adopt. Courts today may struggle with how
to determine such intent, but history shows that as technology becomes
more familiar, admissibility rules will catch up.
While “[t]he evidentiary issues posed by electronically stored
information may be difficult to resolve effectively,”291 undertaking the
effort to apply the existing rules is preferable to attempts to amend the rules
to reflect the current state of technology. There is little doubt that new
forms of Internet communication, or other forms of technology not yet
imagined, will soon emerge. Amending the FRE would result in at best a
temporary answer and at worst a constantly changing set of rules. The best
method to resolve admissibility issues under FRE 801(d)(2) in the Internet
age is to apply well-defined admissibility doctrines, thus furthering the
flexibility of the FRE.
2. Accelerating the Process of Resolving Internet Hearsay Admissibility
Issues Through Education
As Joseph notes, the admissibility issues courts have struggled with in
applying FRE 801(d)(2) to Internet evidence reflect factual novelty, not
unclear legal standards.292 Indeed, the traditional operation of FRE
801(d)(2) has been clearly established.293 Yet courts dealing with newly
emerging Internet evidence seemed weary of accepting the evidentiary
value of online content.294 This reflects the pattern of initial reluctance
Professor Goode identified; thus, as history tells us, the solution to any
admissibility issue can be found through greater understanding and
acceptance of, in this case, Internet technology.295
Given the increasing importance of Internet evidence in litigation,296 it is
appropriate to implement educational measures to familiarize attorneys and
judges with new forms of Internet communication. These technologies
present vast opportunities for nearly anyone to generate out-of-court
statements; thus, it will be helpful for judicial officers to be aware of some
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See Joseph, Supreme Court 2011, supra note 175, at 251.
Moore, supra note 9, at 193; see supra Part IV.C.1.
See Joseph, Internet Evidence, supra note 175, at 19.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.A.
See Goode, supra note 10, at 4.
See Moore, supra note 9, at 148.
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of the intricacies involved. Specifically, they should receive instruction on
how users of specific technologies communicate with each other, how
profiles are organized, and how to evaluate the context of posts on a given
platform. Because of the services’ overwhelming popularity, Facebook and
Twitter instruction should feature prominently.297 To maintain effectiveness
in the future, this educational process should be revisited from time to time
to address any developments in technology. As the Cameron court
indicated, Internet technology and hearsay must be periodically reevaluated
to ensure proper evidentiary determinations are made.298
By instituting educational efforts to familiarize judges and lawyers with
new sources of out-of-court statements, hearsay determinations under the
existing FRE will be made with more consistency and clarity. The current
rules are “adequate to the task” of accommodating electronic evidence.299
All that is needed to resolve uncertainty surrounding online statements is to
provide courts with sufficient understandings of the underlying technology
to apply the current, well-defined legal standards for the admissibility of
online hearsay.
V. Conclusion
The dawning of the Internet age has had a resounding effect in the legal
world. The presence of ESI has caused sweeping changes to the way
lawyers practice. This new form of evidence has already led to the
amendment of the FRCP. The more recent proliferation of online avenues
of communication implicates concerns for the applicability of the current
FRE in the context of hearsay and the admissions doctrine. While it is clear
that the current FRE govern online evidence in the same way they govern
all other types of evidence, this comment attempts to point out the
difficulties presented by Internet communication and the application of
FRE 801(d)(2).
When examining the existing jurisprudential applications of the current
FRE to online situations, it might seem that courts have had little trouble
adapting. Despite early reluctance to accept online evidence, courts have
increasingly found online out-of-court statements admissible under the
current exceptions to the hearsay doctrine. Further, courts often apply FRE
801(d)(2) to admit online statements as non-hearsay. Case law has clearly
297. See Part IV.A.
298. United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160-61 (D. Me. 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012).
299. Goode, supra note 10, at 2.
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established email to be an acceptable form of non-hearsay admission, and
courts also have routinely applied the admissions doctrine to other types of
online content, albeit with more difficulty.
The issues in application of the current FRE emerge when dealing with
new forms of online communication that do not present neat analogies to
pre-Internet evidence. While an email can be easily compared to a physical
letter, content generated through website postings, social networks, and
other non-email online mediums does not readily lend itself to such
comparison. These issues are particularly relevant due to the proliferation
of such new outlets. Despite near ubiquitous use of social media, no clear
rule concerning the admissibility of this type of evidence has emerged. This
speaks to the difficulty presented in applying the current FRE in the online
context. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders has also called into question the applicability of the
current FRE to online out-of-court statements.
The result leaves uncertain both the definition of an online statement and
the point at which such a statement has been made. To resolve this
uncertainty, there are two possible approaches: maintaining the status quo
by continuing to apply the current rules or evaluating the possibility of
amending the FRE to accommodate online conduct. Amending the FRE is
not a satisfactory solution. Adding another rule, particularly one as specific
as would be required to address changing technology, would complicate the
FRE and conflict with recent simplification and streamlining efforts. Also,
no change could account for future developments in Internet technology.
Because of the rapid expansion seen in the last ten years, a new rule
addressing today’s concerns would almost certainly be outdated in the near
future.
Despite the changes in outlets for out-of-court statements, the current
FRE remain adequate to determine the admissibility of hearsay as the
statement of an opposing party. Every evidentiary determination requires a
fact-intensive analysis, factoring in the form, context, and meaning of the
evidence. In evaluating the admissibility of Internet evidence in the
admissions context, this same fact-intensive analysis will be required.
While technological changes make this analysis more complicated and
nuanced, amending the rules is unwarranted. Keeping the current rules
intact while updating courts’ and attorneys’ understandings of technology
will adequately address the present and future difficulties in the application
of the admissions doctrine to online statements.
Dylan Charles Edwards
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